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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REID D. BENCH and ALTA M. 1 
BENCH, his wife, J 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ( Case No 
( 1 3 9 2 9 ' 
ERMA PACE, I 
Defendant and Respondent. ] 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs in this action sued for specific perform-
ance of a Lease-Option Agreement, and Defendant 
counterclaimed for unlawful detainer, also raising de-
fenses of fraud and mutual mistake. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ^ 
A trial without jury was held before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge in the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, on September 25 and 26, 1974. The Court 
held that Mrs. Pace, Defendant, had sustained her bur-
den of pursuasion "by clear, satisfactory, definite and 
1 
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convincing evidence" that at the time of the execution 
of the lease option, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant 
intended to create an interest in Plaintiffs in the oil, 
gas and mineral estate in the subject property and that 
failure of said lease option to contain an express reser-
vation of mineral rights was due to mutual mistake of 
the parties. The trial court further found that Plain-
tiffs had failed to properly exercise their option to pur-
chase, and that the Plaintiffs had agreed to remain under 
the lease arrangement. Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment were entered accordingly, de-
creeing that (1) the agreement be reformed to conform 
to the intent of the parties; (2) Plaintiffs are in unlaw-
ful detainer; (3) Defendant is entitled to past-due rent; 
and (4) the lease-option agreement had terminated. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Respondent seeks an order from this 
Court affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
< . w STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant cannot acquiesce in Plaintiffs' Statement 
of Facts. The omission of pertinent facts supporting 
the trial court's decision necessarily places Plaintiffs' 
Statement in the category of Argument. We will en-
deavor to bring to this Court's attention such missing 
evidence, together with connecting circumstances deemed 
essential to establish logical sequence. 
• • . " • • * . * - . ' • ' _ >; ? • ' r . 
Plaintiffs in this action are husband and wife who 
moved to the Roosevelt, Utah, area in 1965. Defendant 
2 
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is a widow who owns a. small farm northwest of Roose-
velt, Utah. The property in question consists of 120 acres 
with a small home located thereon (T. 76, Ex. 2).1 
In 1962, Defendant entered into an oil lease (Ex. 1) 
involving her property. Three years later in Septem-
ber, 1965, Plaintiffs initiated discussions with Defend-
ant for the purpose of leasing Defendant's farm. On 
September 8, 1965, Plaintiffs, Defendant, and Defend-
ant's son, Aaron Pace, executed a lease with an option 
to purchase involving the subject property. The lease-
option agreement was prepared by an attorney upon the 
instructions of Plaintiff Reid Bench (T. 17). 
The testimony of the Defendant, Erma Pace, her 
daughter, Dawn Brown, and her former daughter-in-
law, Carol Jameson, showed that prior to the execution 
of the said lease-option agreement, the parties had 
agreed that no oil, gas, or mineral rights were to be 
transferred with the property (T. 78, 81, 110, 113, 116, 
118). In fact, Plaintiff Reid Bench stated that he was 
not interested in any oil, gas, or mineral rights, but 
rather desired merely a place to live away from the 
city (T. 116). 
The parties continued to believe that the said oil, 
gas, and mineral rights were not to be transferred with 
the property. On two occasions in 1968 and 1969, Plain-
tiff Reid Bench offered to purchase a portion of Mrs. 
Pace's oil, gas, and mineral rights, but she refused to 
sell (T. 82). 
i"T" refers to Transcript of the testimony and "Ex." refers to 
Exhibit. 
3 
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Plaintiffs fell behind in their rental payments (See 
Ex. 19, T. 52, 58), and on April 1,1969, Plaintiffs agreed 
in writing to pay extra charges incurred by Defendant 
for interest arising through Plaintiffs failure to make 
timely payments under the lease-option agreement (Ex. 
4). Plaintiffs never tendered payment of those excess 
charges (T. 59). 
On January 8, 1971, Plaintiff Keid Bench presented 
a check in the amount of $2,000.00 to Defendant (Exs. 
15, 18) in an attempt to exercise the option, and the 
parties agreed that a new real estate sales agreement 
for the sale of the property was necessary to complete 
the transaction and commenced negotiations to arrive 
at such a new agreement (see Exs. 6, 7, 8, 17, and 20). 
However, the parties were unable to agree upon the 
terms of such new agreement, and they mutually agreed 
to return to the lease arrangement (Ex. 17, 10, 13, 12). 
On April 5, 1971, Plaintiffs were advised by Defendant 
that the $2,000.00 payment did not constitute a valid 
exercise of the option and that either a new contract 
must be executed or the Plaintiffs would continue on 
the lease (Ex. 7). On June 2, 1971, the $2,000.00 was 
sent by Defendant to Plaintiffs (Ex. 17). By letter 
dated June 15, 1971, Plaintiffs accepted the remitted 
$2,000.00, acquiesced in their return to the lease ar-
rangement, and expressed the hope that some agree-
ment could eventually be worked out (Ex. 10). 
In the summer of 1972, Plaintiffs executed a ratifi-
cation of Mrs. Pace's oil lease and a proof of possession 
form, disclaiming any right to any oil under the subject 
property (Exs. 12,13). 
4 
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On separate occasions in the fall of 1973, Plaintiff 
Reid Bench advised two disinterested parties that he 
never intended to purchase the oil, gas, and mineral 
rights from Mrs. Pace and that he knew that she never 
intended to sell them (T. 122, 129, 145). He further 
stated that he first was given the idea that he could 
claim the oil rights by a lawyer he had talked to con-
cerning the lease seven years after the initial signing 
took place (T. 121,122,145). 
It was clear from the evidence as a whole that Mrs. 
Pace did not know that the Plaintiffs claimed oil, gas, 
and mineral rights in the property until she was served 
with a copy of the complaint in this action. (T. 196,197.) 
The Court so found (Finding of Fact No. 5). 
Plaintiffs never complied with the requirements of 
the option, and the lease eventually expired on Septem-
ber 15, 1973, approximately nine months after this law-
suit was filed. 
Defendant served a notice to quit upon the Plaintiffs 
in September, 1973, but Plaintiffs failed to vacate the 
premises (Ex. 21). 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Standard of Review In This Case Is Whether 
The Findings Of The Trial Court Are Supported 
By Competent Evidence. 
All of the findings of the trial court in this case are 
buttressed by testimony of multiple witnesses and var-
5 
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ious documents. If the evidence admitted at the trial is 
competent evidence (which it is), there can be no ques-
tion that the trial court's findings must be upheld. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' main argument in this case is that 
the trial court should not have admitted some evidence 
at the trial which showed the true intent of the parties 
and their mutual mistake. If this court rules that the 
evidence admitted by the trial court was properly ad-
mitted, then this case should be affirmed. HowartJi v. 
Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442 (1973); Olsen 
v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 
(1973). 
2. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Parol Evi-
dence In This Case, And The Contract Was 
Properly Reformed. 
In response to the complaint filed by Appellants, 
the Defendant answered that there had been a mutual 
mistake or fraud in the execution of the original lease-
option agreement. Plaintiffs objected to such a defense 
and moved for a summary judgment. 
Judge George E. Ballif entered a written ruling on 
this motion on September 19, 1973,2 stating in part: 
Although the parol evidence rule would or-
dinarily fix the operation of a written agreement 
1
 to the express language contained within the four 
corners of the instrument and those things flow-
ing therefrom by operation of law, the defend-
2The record is not numbered by page and, therefore, the reference 
to the record must be made by document title and date. 
6 
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ant's claim of a mutual mistake of fact or fraud 
in the failure of the writing to provide for a 
reservation of minerals where defendant claims 
she relied upon plaintiffs and counsel secured by 
plaintiffs to reduce the agreement, including the 
reservation, to writing could, if proved, result 
in a reformation of the agreement or an estoppel 
against plaintiffs' enforcement of same. 
At trial, Judge Sorensen concurred with Judge Bal-
lif's decision and admitted testimony offered by Defend-
ant to show the existence of such mutual mistake or 
fraud. The pertinent portions of that testimony are set 
out below: 
A. [Mrs. Pace] Well, he wanted to lease 
the farm with option to buy, and I told him at 
M
 the time, I said "Now, Mr. Bench, I want you 
- to understand there will be no mineral rights to 
go with the place." And he said, " I agree — or 
I understand that." (T. 78) 
He handed me the pen, the contract, and I 
glanced over it, looked over it the best I could 
with what time I had, and I took the pen in my 
hand and was going to sign, and I looked at him, 
and I said, "Mr. Bench, I want you to under-
stand at this price there is no oil or mineral rights 
to go with the place." And he said, " I under-
stand, and I am not interested in your oil rights.'' 
(T. 81) 
Well, yes, because it was agreed that the oil 
right was to go with me. He was to get the farm 
only. (T. 110). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Plaintiff, Mr. Bench, testified as follows: 
Q [by Mr. Boyden]: At the time you had 
your arrangement with Mrs. Pace in 1965, did you 
then intend that you were leasing the minerals? 
A [by Mr. Bench]: I never thought about 
minerals, oil or gas. (T. 153-54). 
Plaintiff Mrs. Bench was not called to testify dur-
ing the trial because of alleged illness. 
It has been repeatedly held that the parol evidence 
is admissible in a case such as the one at hand. The 
"black letter" rule is clearly stated by Professor Oor-
bin, Contracts, 536 (one vol. ed.): 
Before the legal operation of any agreement 
can be determined, however definitely it may be 
embodied in a written "integration," it must be 
interpreted by the court. For this process of 
interpretation, the "parol evidence rule" does 
not exclude evidence of prior communications and 
understandings (although there may be some 
other limitations on the extent to which such evi-
dence may be used). Until a contract has been 
interpreted, the court cannot know whether there 
is an inconsistency between it and other agree-
ments, oral or written, prior or subsequent. Be-
fore interpretation, a court cannot know what 
it is that cannot be "varied or contradicted." 
In addition, the "rule does not purport to ex-
clude any testimony to prove fraud, illegality, 
accident, or mistake; it does not prevent rescis-
j sion or a decree for reformation and enforce-
ment." [Emphasis added.] 
8 
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Utah cases have followed this rule. Even the prin-
cipal case cited in Plaintiffs' Brief concurs with the rule 
as stated by Professor Corbin: 
Parol evidence may be received to clarify 
ambiguous language in a contract, to show what 
the agreement was relative to filling in blanks, 
and to supply omitted terms which were agreed 
upon but inadvertently left out of the written 
agreement. E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, 
Inc. v. Broderick, .... Utah 2d ...., 522 P.2d 144 
(1974). [Emphasis added.] 
In the present case, there was a clear intent to re-
serve the mineral rights to the Defendant. The parties 
relied upon that intent for seven years. Defendant 
asked the Court for reformation as soon as Plaintiffs 
changed their position by filing the instant suit and 
thereby making the need for the reservation clear. 
Other Utah cases follow the rule cited above. See 
Peterson v. Eldredge, 122 Utah 96, 246 P.2d 886, 888 
(1952); Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 Pac. 100 
(1919); Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theater Co., 82 Utah 
279, 17 P.2d 297 (1932); Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah 
114, 60 P.2d 1115 (1936); Last Chance Ranch v. Erick-
son, 82 Utah 475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933); Naisbitt v. Hodges, 
6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620 (1957); Rosenbrcmgh v. 
Bramch, 117 Utah 74, 213 P.2d 333 (1949); Forrester v. 
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 252 Pac, 206 (1930); Kier v. Condrach, 
25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); and Gray v. Gray, 
108 Utah390,160 P.2d 432 (1945). 
And see the similar case of Nelson v. Daugherty, 
357 P.2d 425, 432-33 (Okl. 1960), where the Court found 
9 
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a mutual mistake in a conveyance dealing with the res-
ervation of mineral rights. The Court said : 
In such case we have, following our earlier 
cases, held in Fabbro v. Eeese, 206 Okl. 665, 246 
P.2d 324, 325, in the syllabus as follows: 
" 1 . In an action for the reformation of a 
deed or contract of sale, parol evidence is admis-
sible to show the parties' intent and mutual mis-
take. 
"2. Evidence to sustain a judgment reform-
ing a written contract must be clear, unequivo-
cal, and decisive, but this does not mean that it 
must be uncontradicted; and the judgment of the 
trial court in such an action, where the evidence 
is conflicting, should be given weight, and should 
be affirmed on appeal, unless the appellate court 
is satisfied that the standard of proof required 
has not been met and the conclusion reached is 
wrong." 
In the body of the opinion, that court said: 
" In Harrell v. Nash, 192 Okl. 95, 133 P.2d 
748, 750, we said: 
"Evidence to sustain a judgment reforming 
a written contract must be clear, unequivocal, and 
_.-* decisive, but does not mean that it must be un-
contradicted ; and the judgment of the trial court 
in such an action, reforming the contract, where 
the evidence is conflicting should be given weight, 
and should be affirmed on appeal, unless the ap-
pellate court is satisfied that the standard of 
proof required has not been met and the conclu-
sion reached is wrong." 
In Crabb v. Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P.2d 
653, we considered a case where the factual situ-
ation was very similar to that involved in the 
10 
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instant case. The mistake in the notes in that 
case was due to an error on the part of the scriv-
M ener, which was not noticed by the plaintiff until 
long subsequent to the date of the execution of 
the notes. In that case we affirmed the judgment 
of the trial court granting reformation, although 
the evidence was conflicting, pointing out that 
the trial court, which had the witnesses before it 
and had an opportunity to observe their demeanor 
and to determine their credibility, had decided 
this issue in favor of the plaintiffs. 
In Walter v. Myers, 206 Okl. 100, 241 P.2d 
393, 394 (1952), paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the 
syllabus it was stated: 
" 1 . In a suit for reformation of a deed it 
;..-. is competent to show the conduct, declarations 
and statements of the parties just before and 
at the time of the execution of the instruments. 
" 2. An action for the reformation of a deed, 
based upon mistake of fact, is an action of equita-
ble cognizance. The general rule is that when, 
f
 because of a mistake of fact, an instrument does 
not express the true intention of the parties, 
equity will correct such mistake unless the rights 
of third parties intervene.'' 
In the present case, no third party rights were im-
paired by the parties' mistake. Thus, this case is an 
appropriate one for equitable relief. 
In Intermowntain Farmers Assn. v. Peart, 30 Utah 
2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973), this Court affirmed a de-
cision by Judge Sorensen wherein he admitted certain 
parol evidence to show that a mutual mistake had been 
committed. This Court held: 
11 
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It should be noted that the plaintiff intended to 
convey two acres and the defendants did not ex-
pect to receive more than two acres. It thus ap-
pears that there was a mutual mistake in the con-
veyance which described five acres. . . . 
The trial court having found the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff on its request to have the 
deed reformed and against the defendants on 
their counterclaim, and the findings of the court 
being supported by the evidence, we find no basis 
to interfere with the findings or the judgment 
entered by the court below. [Emphasis added.] 
In the present case, as in Peart, the Appellants 
did not expect to receive what they now claim through 
litigation. This fact was proved not only by the parol 
evidence involving matters preceding the execution of 
the lease, but also by the additional testimony of Mrs. 
Pace, Mr. Burdick, and Mr. Anderton in addition to 
the oil lease ratification and affidavit signed by the 
Plaintiffs. These matters of evidence are more fully 
discussed below. They show clearly that the Plaintiffs 
considered themselves as lessees of the surface with no 
right or interest in the mineral rights. 
Appellants' efforts to employ the parol evidence 
rule to hide the true and concurring intent of the parties 
are repugnant to law and equity. As aptly stated in the 
oft-cited case of Andersonian Inv. Co. v. Wade, 184 Pac. 
327, 330 (Wash. 1919): 
The parol evidence rule is intended to prevent, 
not promote, frauds, and it would be a fraud to 
allow a party to a written agreement to enforce 
it as written when he has agreed not to do, where 
12 
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the other on the faith of the agreement, has acted 
thereupon to his detriment. 
The cases cited by Appellants on the subject of 
parol evidence are distinguishable from the case at bar. 
For example, the case of E. A. Strout Western Realty 
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, as cited by Plaintiffs 
is clearly distinguished from the case at bar. In that 
case, the attempt was to change the clear terms of a 
written instrument. In the present case, there is not 
a word in the instrument about oil or minerals. Plain-
tiffs attempt to rely on a presumption of which Plain-
tiffs were not even aware until they consulted lawyers 
on the subject. 
The case of Rainford v. Ryttmg, 22 Utah 2d 252, 
451 P.2d 769 (1969), does not purport to give an ex-
haustive statement of the parol evidence rule. No issue 
of mistake or omitted terms was raised in that case, 
and the opinion cannot be deemed as precedent on is-
sues not before the Court in this case. The inclusion 
of mistake and omitted terms as exceptions to the parol 
evidence rule in the subsequent E. A. Strout decision 
cited next above clearly evidences the non-general nature 
of Plaintiff's quotation from the Rainford case. 
The case of Jensen v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 
259 (1958), concerned a claimed unilateral mistake in 
the execution of a conditional sales contract for the pur-
chase of an automobile. The instant case concerns, as 
the trial court found, omitted terms resulting from the 
mutual mistake of the parties. As the Jensen decision 
13 
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indicated, a court should first seek to determine the in-
tention of the contracting parties; if that intention is 
embodied in the written contract, such contract will be 
enforced. If, as the trial court found herein, such in-
tention is not embodied in the written contract as a re-
sult of mutual mistake, parol evidence is proper to en-
able the court to determine the intent. There having 
been no manifestation of assent in the written document 
on the issue of oil rights, the Jensen case cannot be con-
trolling herein. 
In the case of Davidson v. Bobbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 
517 P.2d 1026 (1973), the Supreme Court held that no 
contract existed between the parties as a result of the 
alleged agreement's failure to include a sufficient legal 
description of the property to be conveyed to enable 
the court to grant specific performance. The distinction 
is drawn between identification of the interest conveyed 
by parol evidence and of using such evidence to supply 
a missing description. In the instant case there is no 
question as to the geographical location of the property 
involved; the question is one of identifying what inter-
ests were intended to pass with the described land. Parol 
evidence is properly allowed to identify the interest 
which the parties intended to pass when by mutual mis-
take the otherwise proper legal description did not ex-
pressly reserve such interests as were not intended to 
pass. See E. A. Strout v. BrodericJc, supra. The trial 
court properly identified the interest which was to pass 
as not including mineral rights. Such a result is not at 
variance with the holding of the Dcwidson case. 
14 
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The case of Clyde v. Eddington Canning Co., 10 Utah 
2d 14, 347 P.2d 563 (1959), concerned an attempt to vary 
the clearly expressed intention on a personal guarantee 
by parol evidence on the basis of a unilateral mistake. 
That case has no precedential value where, as here, there 
is no express reservation of mineral rights and a find-
ing of mutual mistake resulting in the omission. To the 
same effect is the case of Lenman v. Jones, 221 U.S. 
51, 32 S.Ct. 18, 56 L.Ed. 89 (1911), which similarly in-
volved only a claimed unilateral mistake. 
There are numerous Utah cases dealing with refor-
mation of an instrument on the ground of mutual mis-
take such as was present here. Plaintiffs-Appellants 
make no attempt to distinguish any of those cases. For 
example, see Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 
620, 623 (1957), and cases cited therein: 
The guiding criteria are well established. Mutual 
*> mistake of fact may be defined as error in re-
ducing the concurring intentions of the parties 
to writing. Peterson v. Paulson, 24 Wash. 2d 166, 
163 P.2d 830 (1945). 
This principle has consistently been applied in 
equity throughout the reformation of instrument 
cases. Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 
571; Gray v. Gray, 108 Utah 388, 160 P.2d 432; 
Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah 114, 60 P.2d 1115; 
George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust C, 69 Utah 460, 
256 P.400; Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 
P.100; Wherritt v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 P. 
534; "Weight v. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 P. 899; 
Deseret National Bank v. Dinwoodey, 17 Utah 43, 
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53 P. 215; Ewing v. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 52 P.4. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In the instant case, as under the Naisbitt language 
cited above, there was an error in reducing the plain 
and concurring intentions of the parties to writing. This 
is mutual mistake as the trial court properly found and 
serves as a correct basis for reforming the lease-option 
agreement. 
In addition to the testimony of the Defendant, Mrs. 
Pace, coupled with the failure of the Plaintiff, Mr. Bench, 
to testify that he intended to lease with option to pur-
chase the mineral rights of the property in question, 
Dawn Brown, a daughter of Defendant, testified that 
before the signing: 
My mother told Mr. Bench that the place was 
going for twenty thousand; that there would be 
no mineral rights; and ask him if he understood 
that, and he said, "Yes, I do. I am not interested 
in mineral rights. I just want to get my children 
out of the city." T. 116. 
Carol Jameson testified that at the time of the sign-
ing: 
I remember Erma [Pace] saying — telling Mr. 
Bench that none of the oil went with it, and I 
remember Mr. Bench telling Erma that he wasn't 
interested in anything like that. T. 118. 
Thus, the mutual mistake of fact, consisting of the 
error in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties 
to writing, occurred either when Plaintiff Bench failed 
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to properly instruct his attorney, or his attorney failed 
to clearly set down the intentions of the parties. 
The contract does not employ the usual terms of 
conveying "the following described real estate." The 
contract stated, 
[T]he Owners have agreed to LEASE and sub-
sequently SELL to the buyers that certain one 
hundred twenty (120) acre irrigated farm located 
approximately ten miles northwest of the city of 
Roosevelt, County of Duchesne, state of Utah, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
NE y4 NE y4; Sec, 28, T 1 S., R. 2W., 
TJ.S.M. and also E y2 SE y4; Sec. 21, T. 
1 S., R. 2W., TJ.S.M. 
The Owners have agreed to lease the farm to 
* the Buyers with a guaranteed purchase option, 
the lease period not to exceed three (3) years 
u beginning September 15,1965. [Emphasis added.] 
On cross-examination, Mrs. Pace testified: 
[I]t was agreed that the oil right was to go 
with me. He [Mr. Bench] was to get the farm 
only. (R. 10). [Emphasis added.] 
A review of the document shows that this intent was 
expressed— at least partially. 
At any time during this three-year lease 
period, the Buyers shall have the option to " pur-
chase" the farm on the following terms and con-
ditions : . . . [Emphasis added.] (Ex. 21) 
The reference to the farm as opposed to the more cus-
tomary "above-described real estate" or "property de-
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scribed above" illustrates the parties' mistake and at 
the very least creates an ambiguity requiring further 
clarification. Mrs. Pace attempted to explain her mis-
take at the trial as follows (B. 113) :3 
Q [by Mr. Boyden]: Mrs. Pace, you stated to 
Mr. Black that at the time you entered into this 
lease, Exhibit 2, that you knew before you signed 
it that the mineral reserves ought to be — or 
v
 that the minerals ought to be reserved. What 
did you mean by that ? 
A. I meant we had talked it over and I figured 
that he knew they were to come to me. I didn't 
have any idea that he figured they went with the 
farm. [Emphasis added.] 
Again, at T. 77, the question was asked, 
Q. Can you tell me what you meant by that [ref-
erence to ii farm'' in Ex. 2] ? 
A. That was the farm only. [Emphasis added.] 
3Although counsel for Appellants make repeated reference to a 
certain question asked by Mr. Black regarding Mrs. Pace's knowledge 
of the failure to have an express mineral reservation in the contract 
(App. Br. 6, 32, 55), they conspicuously omit her explanation. When 
Mr. Black received his answer, he abruptly changed subjects because it 
was apparent she was not truly expressing her thoughts. (T. 110). It 
was on redirect examination that Mrs. Pace was given her first oppor-
tunity to explain her answer (T. 113). In fair and proper sequence 
the full answer is as follows: 
(T. 110) 
Q: You were aware very early in the proceedings of the failure 
to have the reservation of oil and gas rights in the document, were 
you not? 
A: I was aware that it should have been in there before I ever 
signed it. 
(T. 113) 
Q: . . . What did you mean by that? 
A: I meant we had talked it over and I figured that he knew 
they were to come to me. I didn't have any idea that he figured 
they went with the farm. 
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Thus, to the parties' understanding, the lease-option 
agreement did reserve the questioned oil, gas, and min-
eral rights to Mrs. Pace and gave an option to the Plain-
tiffs to buy only the farm— without any mineral rights. 
This can also be seen by the usage of the term "farm" 
which was carried over to the lease extension agree-
ment signed by both parties on May 22, 1967, and which 
provided in part (Ex. 16): 
Be it known that as of this date, May 22, 
1967, the undersigned parties to a lease agree-
ment regarding a farm located in Duchesne 
County . . . [Emphasis added.] 
There is no doubt in light of the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence that the parties both possessed 
"concurring intentions" on this point. In Mr. Bench's 
letter agreeing to return to the rental arrangement, he 
stated: 
It is only our desire and intention to purchase 
the farm as per our original lease-purchase agree-
ment and the terms there outlined (Ex. 10). [Em-
phasis added. 1 
The parties clearly knew that they did not intend to 
include oil, gas, and mineral rights in the transaction. 
They merely intended to lease the farm — or the sur-
face — without the minerals. 
To the extent that the Agreement should have con-
tained words more explicitly reserving mineral rights 
to the Defendant, the parties were mistaken. But neither 
the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant was aware of this 
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mistake at the date of execution of the contract. The 
dispute was created at a later date as hereinbefore ex-
plained. 
3. The Subsequent Conduct Of The Parties Showed 
Their Intent To Reserve The Oil, Gas, And Min-
eral Rights To The Defendant. 
In addition to the evidence which was admitted to 
show the intent of the parties at the time the lease-
option was executed, other corroborating evidence was 
admitted which further demonstrated that the intent of 
the parties was to reserve the oil, gas, and mineral rights 
to the Defendant, Mrs. Pace. 
Thus, even if all prior and contemporaneous testi-
mony were disregarded, there would still be ample evi-
dence remaining to clearly show the parties' intent and 
require reformation within the rule as established by 
this court in Naisbitt, supra. 
In Naisbitt, the Court stated: 
The sufficiency of the evidence in this case 
- cannot be doubted when viewed in its entirety and 
in light of the findings of the trial court. 
In Naisbitt, the Court then itemized what the record 
disclosed. "We follow the same procedure and limit ref-
erences only to matters occurring after the signing of 
the lease. 
First, Mrs. Pace testified that on two occasions 
long after the lease was signed, Mr. Bench sought to 
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buy some of her interest in the oil rights to the property. 
She testified : 
There was twice when he asked me if I could 
change my mind or wouldn't change my mind 
about the oil rights. (T. 82.) 
These occasions occurred in 1968 and 1969 when Mr. 
Bench had stopped at Mrs. Pace's house to make his 
rental payments (T. 82). 
Second, and very importantly, two independent wit-
nesses also testified that Mr. Bench had informed them 
as late as the fall of 1973 that he had never intended 
to buy any oil rights from Mrs. Pace and that he knew 
that she never intended to sell such rights, but only due 
to the advice of an attorney had he decided to try to take 
them from her. Max Burdick, a Roosevelt businessman, 
testified concerning a conversation with Plaintiff Bench 
occurring in September, 1973 (T. 122-23): 
He [Mr. Bench] said he remembered that Erma 
[Pace] had told him in the beginning that she 
didn't want to sell her oil rights. And I told him 
I knew this was true, because I had tried to buy 
them previously to that and she had refused to 
sell them to me. She said she wouldn't sell for 
no price. And then he told me, he said, that he 
went to see his attorneys in Salt Lake and they 
had talked. He went to see them about some kind 
of fire insurance on the old [Pace] house or 
something like this. And they had found a flaw 
in the contract and told him they figured they 
could get the oil rights for him. 
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Testimony on the fee arrangement between the attorney 
and Mr. Bench was stricken by the Court. (T. 122) 
- -'"•• I told him [Mr. Bench] I had offered to buy the 
oil rights previously to that time from Erma 
[Mrs. Pace] and I would have paid her more 
than he paid for the whole ranch just for the oil 
rights if she would have sold them, but she ab-
solutely refused to sell them for any price. 
Mr. Burdick further testified: 
Mr. Bench also told me that he knew at the time 
that him and Mrs. Pace made the contract that 
he knew he wasn't buying the oil rights, and he 
knew — that he didn't know this until his at-
torneys — until he talked to his attorneys later. 
Tom Anderton, another businessman in the area, 
also had a conversation with Mr. Bench in September, 
1973. Mr. Anderton stated: 
Now we had a lengthy conversation also in 
which Eeid [Bench] told me that when the con-
. ; tract was entered into there was no mineral rights 
that was transferred with the property and he 
knew that . . . . 
# # # 
Okay, and he [Mr. Bench] said that he had some 
negotiations with Erma [Pace] on her property 
to renegotiate the mineral rights, and he could 
not get any negotiations; therefore, he was going 
to sue for the full mineral rights on the prop-
erty. . . . (T.129.) 
Third, in the summer of 1972, the Plaintiffs them-
selves signed two documents stating that they had no 
claim to the oil rights in the subject property which 
oil rights had been leased by Mrs. Pace over ten years 
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before. Exhibit 12, executed on June 1, 1972, by Plain-
tiff, states in relevant part: 
The undersigned (Reid D. Bench), of lawful 
age, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he occupies the above described land as 
lessee of surface, with option to purchase, from 
Erma Pace, the owner thereof; that he became 
such lessee on the 15th day of September, 1965, 
and that his tenancy is for eight years and will 
expire on the 15th day of September, 1973. That 
he claims no title to said land other than as tenant 
with option to purchase as aforesaid, and does 
hereby state and declare that his right to pos-
session in no way interferes with the right to said 
owner to lease said lands for oil and gas devel-
opment purposes, and that his possession as ten-
ant is subject to the rights of any lessee or as-
signee under any oil and/or gas lease executed 
by such owner. [Emphasis added.] 
Plaintiff later claimed that he intended to delete the 
term "lessee of the surface" but omitted to do so (T. 
46). The trial court evidently did not credit that testi-
mony. But even if that term were deleted, it is clear 
from the balance of the affidavit that the Plaintiffs 
claimed no right to the oil rights. 
(Similarly, on July 6, 1972, Plaintiffs executed a rat-
ification of the oil lease renewal signed by Mrs. Pace 
on June 30, 1971. That ratification states in part (Ex. 
13): 
The undersigned [Plaintiffs] . . . do hereby 
ratify, approve and confirm that certain oil and 
gas lease dated June 30, 1971, executed by Erma 
Marie Pace. . . ; the undersigned hereby fully 
recognize said oil and gas lease as being in full 
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force and effect as though the undersigned had 
personally signed, sealed and acknowledged the 
same. The undersigned are tenants with option 
to purchase from Erma Marie Pace. 
The subject oil lease (Ex. 11) provided that all the oil 
royalties from the subject property were to be paid to 
Mrs. Pace. The Plaintiffs clearly consented to that ar-
rangement and plainly considered themselves as mere 
tenants with an unexercised option to purchase. These 
documents were executed nearly seven years after the 
original lease was executed. They indicate that Plain-
tiffs believed they had no interest in oil rights even 
then. They further show that Plaintiffs considered them-
selves as tenants under a lease-option agreement expir-
ing on September 15,1973. 
Thus, on the basis of the foregoing testimony and 
evidence the Trial Court found: 
By clear, satisfactory, definite and convinc-
ing evidence, it was established that the lease and 
option contract through mutual mistake omitted 
the reservation of the minerals and failed to con-
form to the intent of the parties at the time of 
the execution of the instrument in that the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights were not reserved to the 
Defendant. (Finding of Fact No. 4). 
In light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
referred to above, there was no doubt that the parties 
had erroneously omitted the express reservation of min-
eral rights from the lease-option agreement. The Trial 
Court properly reformed the agreement to conform to 
the parties' intent. 
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4. The Statute Of Frauds Does Not Prevent The 
Beformation Of The Lease-Option In This Case. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants urge upon this Court that the 
equity powers of reformation of instruments are limited 
by the Statute of Frauds. No ease is cited which sup-
ports this unique assertion. All of the cases cited above 
dealing with the reformation of documents in real estate 
transactions would tend to controvert Appellants' argu-
ment. 
The old case of Papanickolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 
404, 272 Pac, 856 (1929), which is cited and quoted by 
Appellants, does not support Appellants' theory. Pap-
cmickolas was not an action to reform a document so 
that it would conform to the parties' intent, but rather 
it involved an attempt by one party to enforce an oral 
contract for the sale of land. Upon a directed verdict 
refusing to require such sale, the Court found that there 
was no substantial evidence supporting the Appellant 
and, therefore, affirmed the lower court's decision. Spe-
cifically, the Court found that there was no evidence of 
mistake or fraudulent intent as there is in the present 
case. 
Indeed, Appellants seem to ignore the rule that the 
Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where the result 
would be to perpetrate a fraud. See Easton v. Wycoff, 
4 Utah 2d 386, 332 P.2d 332, 334 (1956), which is in-
correctly cited by Appellants. The Easton case points 
out that the Statute of Frauds would not be applied in 
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a case where such application of the Statute would oper-
ate to defraud. 
It should be noted that in this case, it was not nec-
essary that the trial court find the Appellants guilty of 
fraud. But, if there were no mistake, as Appellants con-
tend, and if Appellants knew the contract conveyed min-
erals contrary to their express agreement, a court of 
equity surely would not assist in such an effort to de-
fraud. 
It has been clear from the inception of this case 
that Plaintiffs-Appellants have desired to utilize the 
Statute of Frauds (and the parol evidence rule) to keep 
from the trier of fact certain evidence demonstrating 
the true intent of the parties. While Justice may be 
blind, She is not ignorant or insensitive to truth, and 
Appellants' efforts to conceal the truth in this case are 
so obvious that they could not possibly go unnoticed. 
In fact, Appellants' efforts at concealment only serve 
to call attention to the conduct of the Plaintiffs in seek-
ing to obtain from a widow more than their bargain 
provided for. No legal principle requires the application 
of the Statute of Frauds to perpetrate such an injustice. 
Utah cases, including even the cases cited by Plaintiffs-
Appellants, point out that such a result will not be per-
mitted by Utah courts. 
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5. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Position Kegarding Fraud 
Is A Strawman Argument. 
The findings of fact in this case make no mention 
of fraud. Yet, Plaintiffs-Appellants devote twelve pages 
of their Brief to argue that there was no fraud. 
Defendant raised the issue of fraud in her Answer 
as an alternative defense along with the defense of mis-
take. In short, Defendant's position was simply that 
either the parties made a mutual mistake or else De-
fendant made a mistake and Plaintiffs committed fraud. 
The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence 
that there had been a mutual mistake. Thus, the issue 
of fraud as belabored in Plaintiffs' Brief is merely a 
strawman beyond the trial court's decision. 
It was not necessary for the trial court to find fraud 
because it appeared that the failure to include an ex-
press mineral reservation in the contract was a mutual 
mistake. 
Nevertheless, if there were no mistake, there would 
be fraud, and specific performance being an equita-
ble action Plaintiffs must do equity. In view of the 
Plaintiffs' repeated statements that he knew he was not 
leasing or buying the mineral rights, equity forbids him 
to gainsay his own acts and assertions. 
Perhaps two of the most basic rules of equity are 
that he who seeks equity must do equity (Carbon Canal 
Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 19 Utah 2d 6, 425 
P.2d 405 (1967)), and that equitable relief will be de-
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nied where the Plaintiff lacks "clean hands" or where 
he is guilty of deceit or an impure motive (see, e.g., 
Iven v. Roder, 431 P.2d 321 (Okl. 1967)). 
Suffice it to say, as was indicated in the Ander-
soman case quoted above, "i t would be a fraud to allow 
a party to a written agreement to enforce it as written 
when he has agreed not to do so." If there were no 
mutual mistake here, there would be a fraud. 
6. The Lease And Option Expired Without Being 
Exercised And Plaintiffs Have No Eemaining 
Interest In The Property. 
The entire foregoing discussion is mooted to some 
extent by the fact that the Plaintiffs never properly 
exercised their option and the lease agreement expired 
as of September 15, 1973. The evidence admitted dur-
ing the trial clearly established this fact. A review of 
that evidence demonstrates that the Trial Court prop-
erly concluded: 
Regardless of whether Plaintiffs properly ex-
ercised their option to purchase, they acquiesced 
in the return of their down payment and agreed 
to continue under the lease agreement and their 
right to exercise their option expired with the 
termination of the lease extension on September 
15,1973. (Conclusions of Law No. 6.) 
The lease-option agreement specifically provided, 
" I t is agreed and understood that the payment of the 
above rentals shall be a consideration for the granting 
of the option to purchase contained herein" (Ex. 2). 
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Mr. Bench admitted during his testimony that he 
had not made the specified payments in a timely fashion 
(T. 52, 58). Exhibit 19, which was prepared by Mr. 
Bench, revealed that throughout virtually the entire first 
six years of the lease period, Mr. Bench was in arrears, 
often by several hundred dollars. 
On April 1, 1969, Mr. Bench agreed to pay the addi-
tional charges incurred by Mrs. Pace because of Mr. 
Bench's delinquent rental payments (Ex. 4). Mr. Bench 
never paid or tendered those additional charges (T. 59). 
On January 8, 1971, Mr. Bench and Mrs. Pace dis-
cussed the sale of the property. At that time, Mr. Bench 
presented a check to Mrs. Pace in the amount of $2,000.00, 
but Mr. Bench did not tender payment of the late charges, 
nor did he tender any pro-rated payment of the $600.00 
annual farm lease rental (T. 84). 
The parties agreed to enter into a new agreement 
which would provide for the sale of the subject prop-
erty. Mrs. Pace presented a proposal (Ex. 6) and Mrs. 
Bench also presented a proposal in her own handwrit-
ing (Ex. 20). Both parties had raised objections con-
cerning the initial lease-option agreement. 
Mr. Bench delayed in signing the new agreement. 
Finally, on April 5, 1971, Mr. Bench was notified that 
if a new agreement could not be reached, the former 
lease arrangement would continue (Ex. 7). 
Mr. Bench responded to that notice by listing his 
objections to the new proposed agreement (Ex. 8). Those 
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objections included the failure of the new agreement to 
accumulate past rent payments as payments against 
principal and the requirement that he pay property and 
water taxes. Mr. Bench suggested the need for further 
discussions, but did not object in any way to the reser-
vation of mineral rights which was expressly set forth 
in the new proposal. 
On June 2, 1971, Mrs. Pace returned the $2,000.00 
payment to Mr. Bench, advising him: 
[T]he place just isn't for sale without a signed 
sale contract. You are now back on the lease con-
tract. (Ex. 17). 
On June 15, 1971, Mr. Bench wrote to Mrs. Pace 
(Ex. 10) and stated: u 
In accordance with your letter dated June 2nd 
[Ex. 17] and Mr. Beaslins of May 4 [Ex. 7] I am 
enclosing $1,200.00. This mil pay the full amount 
due under the lease agreement for the year 1971. 
I plan to invest the balance of the funds you re-
turned to me in hopes of being able to again come 
forward with at least a $2,000.00 down payment 
before Jan. 1972. 
?
 * # # 
Mr. Bench also noted several objections to the proposed 
contract, but again failed to raise any objection con-
cerning mineral rights.
 ?r ,i r ; M * 
Mr. Bench continued to make rent payments, but 
did not "come forward with" the down payment as he 
indicated in his letter. . ; • • . ; , . ' : • • : . . 
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On June 1, 1972, Mr. Bench signed a proof of pos-
session (Ex. 12) wherein he admitted that he consid-
ered himself as a tenant with an option to purchase. On 
July 7, 1972, both Mr. and Mrs. Bench signed a ratifica-
tion agreement approving Mrs. Pace's oil lease of the 
subject property and again stated that they were ten-
ants with an option to purchase (Ex. 13). 
The foregoing evidence illustrates the following 
points: 
(1) The Plaintiffs failed to provide the con-
sideration required in the lease-option agreement 
and therefore precluded the possibility of their 
exercise of the option. 
(2) The Plaintiffs never tendered a suffi-
cient amount of money to exercise their option. 
They never tendered late charges or the prorated 
farm rental due. 
(3) The parties agreed that an additional 
agreement was required to culminate the trans-
action.4 
(4) The parties were unable to agree upon 
terms, but the question of oil rights was never 
objected to by Plaintiffs. 
(5) The Plaintiffs accepted the return of 
their moneys and agreed to return to the lease 
arrangement. 
•, (6) Plaintiffs considered themselves as ten-
ants with an unxercised option to purchase as late 
as July 7,1972. 
4The original lease-option agreement was defective in that the 
formula for payment of the purchase price did not require the even-
tual payment of the full price; no method of conveyance was specified; 
and the property description was inadequate or uncertain. Many other 
usual terms were omitted. Although these were not essential, they 
all formed the basis for the parties' agreement that a new contract 
was needed. 
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The lease finally expired as of September 15, 1973. 
Defendant served a notice to quit at that time (Ex. 21). 
Thus, the Trial Court was correct in ruling that 
the lease-option had expired and that the Plaintiffs have 
no remaining interest in the subject property. Because 
this is true, it is academic whether the lease-option re-
served the mineral rights. Since Plaintiffs now have 
no right under that expired lease, the question of the 
mineral reservation is mooted. 
Appellants argue in their brief (pp. 50-54) that the 
option was exercised. The foregoing facts upon which 
the trial court relied showed clearly that the option was 
never properly exercised (Findings of Fact No. 11 and 
Conclusion of Law No. 5). The language of the lease-
option agreement was far from clear, contrary to what 
Appellants suggest. But, more importantly, Appellants 
never tendered a sufficient sum to exercise their option, 
nor did they make their rental payments timely. 
In addition, the parties agreed to prepare a new 
agreement. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant proposed 
several additional new terms for the new agreement. 
Most importantly, when agreement upon the new 
contract appeared unlikely, the parties agreed in writ-
ing to continue to be governed by the lease arrangement 
(Exs. 6, 7, 8, 17, 20,10). Appellants conspicuously avoid 
referring to that agreement in their Brief. Neverthe-
less, the agreement was made in writing and rental pay-
ments were made pursuant to that agreement (Ex. 19, 
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T. 52, 58). Plaintiffs signed two additional documents 
confirming their intentions to continue their status as 
lessees. (Exs. 12,13). 
Appellants attempt to excuse their failure to exer-
cise their option by arguing that the Defendant would 
have rejected such an effort. They presented no evi-
dence to prove such an assertion. The trial court weighed 
the evidence which was presented and found contrary 
to the Plaintiffs on this issue. It is untimely and im-
proper to suggest on appeal that evidence should now 
be imagined that a proper tender could have or would 
have been made by the Plaintiffs and also that the De-
fendants should be presumed to have rejected any proper 
tender. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' assertion (at p. 53 of their 
Brief) that they in effect could abrogate the agreement 
of the parties to follow the lease arrangement by the 
making of allegations in a complaint for specific per-
formance are equally unsuppor table. No case law stands 
for such a proposition and the trial court obviously did 
not so find. 
The facts omitted by Plaintiffs in their argument 
are crucial to this issue. Those facts were found by the 
trial court to be contrary to Plaintiffs' current position 
on appeal. Those findings should not now be disturbed 
by hypothetical arguments. 
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. 7. The Other Issues Raised by Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Are Without Merit. 
a. Statute of Limitations. 
-•••• Plaintiffs-Appellants suggested that the statute of 
limitations bars the defenses of fraud or mistake in 
this case. This argument is faulty in three respects: 
First, the cases cited do not stand for the proposition 
that the statute of limitations bars the defenses of fraud 
and mistake. The cases merely state that a cause of 
action is barred. 
The ultimate purpose of the limitation law is thus 
to bar actions rather than to suppress or deny matters 
of defense. This purpose is aptly stated in the case of 
Liter v. Hoagland, 305 Ky. 329, 204 S.W. 2d 219, 220 
(1947), stating: 
Limitation law is not intended to bar nor smother 
any mere defense of a party so as to compel him 
to stand dumb and mute while his antagonist 
bludgeons his head with every weapon in the book 
of legal, offensive warfare. 
The rule is well-settled in other jurisdictions, includ-
ing Utah, that such statutes are not applicable to de-
fenses, but apply only where affirmative relief is sought. 
See generally, 78 A.L.R. 1074 and the numerous cases 
cited therein. 
The above general rule is particularly applied in 
cases where the statute of limitations is pleaded as a 
defense to fraud. See Miles v. Parkinson, 196 Okl. 414, 
165 P.2d 644, 646 (1946), which states the general rule 
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that the statutes limiting actions after discovery of 
fraud apply only as against actions, and not defenses. 
That ease involved an action to obtain title under a 
county commissioner's deed, where county commission-
ers sought to justify their action in refusing to deliver 
deed after sale of property acquired by county at tax 
resale had been consummated on the ground that the 
purchaser had practiced fraud in procuring the sale. 
The Court held that the commissioners were not pre-
cluded by statute of limitations from setting up other 
defense of fraud because they did not set up their de-
fense until long after expiration of two years from date 
of discovering alleged fraud. Put another way: 
Limitations do not run against defenses; the stat-
ute of limitations is available only as a shield, 
not as a sword. Dredge Corporation v. Wells 
Cargo, Inc., 80 Nev. 99, 389 P.2d 394, 396 (1964). 
In accord is the case of Styles v. Bodkin, 43 Ca. 2d 839, 
111 P.2d 675, 678 (1941), stating that makers of a note 
could defend action on the note on the ground of fraud 
and the defense would not be barred by latches or by 
limitation. 
Utah is in line with the general rule that statutes 
of limitation apply to actions, not defenses. In Stewart 
Livestock Company v. Ostler, 105 U. 529, 144 P.2d 276, 
284 (1943), the Court holds: 
Though a claim may be barred by the statute of 
limitations insofar as the right to recover a judg-
ment is concerned, such claim may be set off 
against an adversary's claim, . ,v. , /,, ; 
» # # 
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A creditor who takes security for payment with-
out delivering full consideration which repre-
sented he was giving cannot plead statutes of 
limitation to a plea of partial failure of consider-
ation. 
Thus, Ostler allowed the defendant debtor's cross-
demands against the plaintiff creditor to stand. 
In short, raising the statute of limitations as a bar 
to defenses of fraud and mistake is a mere red herring 
designed to conceal the truth from the scales of justice. 
The Courts have rejected this type of concealment. 
A second weakness in the statute of limitation ar-
gument arises from the fact that the first time the 
fraud or mistake in this case was brought to the atten-
tion of the Defendant was when the complaint was filed. 
The defenses were raised long before the expiration of 
a three-year period. Weighing the evidence, the Trial 
Court so found (Conclusions of Law, No. 4). Plaintiffs-
Appellants incorrectly state that Mrs. Pace knew about 
the mistake (or fraud) in 1965. She testified that she 
thought the oil, gas, and mineral rights had been re-
served to her because she was only conveying an inter-
est in the " farm" (seeR, 110,113). 
Thus, Mrs. Pace made her mistake in 1965 but did 
not know it had been made until the Plaintiffs sued her 
in late 1972. Her responsive pleading timely raised the 
defenses of fraud and mistake. She was not negligent, 
as Appellants incorrectly assert (at p. 38 of their Brief), 
in seeking to correct the mutual mistake. > 
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Mrs. Pace was not schooled in the law and obviously 
did not have any idea Plaintiffs would seek to take her 
oil rights from her. Everything Plaintiffs did led her 
to believe that there was absolutely no problem in this 
regard until the complaint was filed. 
A third weakness in the statute of limitations ar-
gument is found in the fact that Plaintiff failed to raise 
this issue in the pretrial hearing. It was not made a 
part of the pretrial order. Plaintiffs' counsel did not 
raise this issue until after the pretrial order had been 
entered and finalized and the trial set. 
b. Failure to Produce Son as a Witness. 
Defendant called three witnesses who testified con-
cerning the pre-execution discussions and intent of the 
parties. Plaintiffs objected to that testimony at trial. 
Now, Plaintiffs assert that a further cumulative wit-
ness should have been called to testify to the same mat-
ters and that Defendant's failure to do so has some sig-
nificance. 
Defendant submits that this argument is totally 
without support and certainly does not in any way de-
tract from the great weight of clear and convincing 
evidence already in the Record. 
It might just as easily be asked why Plaintiff Mrs. 
Alta Bench did not testify or, if she really was unable 
to attend the trial, why her testimony was not brought 
in by way of deposition. A similar question could be 
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asked concerning the notary who, according to Plaintiff 
Bench (but denied by Mrs. Pace), witnessed the parties' 
signatures. 
Moreover, nothing prevented the Plaintiffs from 
calling Aaron Pace as an adverse witness. 
Appellants also argue (at p. 54 of their Brief) that 
Defendant failed to carry her burden of proof which 
was to show that both Mrs. Pace and her son, Aaron, 
had been mistaken. However, this argument is un-
founded. The evidence which was admitted at the trial 
showed that Aaron Pace was present at the time the 
initial discussions were held and that he was in attend-
ance when Mr. Bench and Mrs. Pace agreed that the 
mineral rights were not to be transferred. There was 
absolutely no evidence introduced which would in any 
way indicate that Aaron Pace had any understanding 
other than that which would flow from the discussions 
of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
When Appellants' efforts at obfuscation are strip-
ped away, the simple facts of this case remain: Plain-
tiffs and Defendant never intended to include the oil, 
gas, and mineral rights as a part of the lease-option for 
the farm. Plaintiffs never properly exercised the op-
tion but did agree in writing, to return to lease basis. 
The trial court was not deceived or thwarted by 
Plaintiffs' posture in this case. Upon competent, clear, 
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and convincing evidence, the trial court entered its find-
ings and conclusions and judgment. It is submitted that 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED: April 10,1975 
Respectfully submitted, 
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, EOMNEY 
& HOWARD 
By John S. Boyden 
By John Paul Kennedy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Erma Marie Pace 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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of the foregoing Brief of Respondent Erma Pace were 
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Appellants, 10 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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